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Concepts and technologies of information and communication are dis-
cussed in the context of political philosophy and ontology. The questions
of what is the meaning and sense of “information” and “communication”
in modern political philosophy and what are the roles of technologies of
such are discussed in regard to two notions of power and community: con-
stitutional and constituent. The responsibility of designing and using infor-
mation and communication technologies in response to an ontologically
primary “social net” is discussed. One, ethical-political, role of the relation
of philosophy to information is discussed.
I. Introduction
In this article, I would like to consider two models of community—
one founded upon constitutional power and one founded upon constituent
power—that give rise to various forms of agency and identity: the modern
state or nation, cultural or social senses of community, and last, but not least,
the organization of the self. I would like to consider these two models from
the perspective of ontology, communication, and information. To position
communication and information events and technologies within a problem
of community through the framework of ontology means to engage such
events and technologies within political philosophy. In particular, I would like
to ask if the information and communication model popularly known as the
“conduit metaphor,” which is still the dominant theoretical model in com-
munication studies and in library and information studies, adequately models
the different levels of community or organization that make up our macro-
social selves and our more micropersonal selves. In two early, but foundation-
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al, works, “Animal Songs” (Day, 1996) and “Diagrammatic Bodies” (Day,
1998), I investigated the issue of community in terms of the “in-common”
relations of beings, including humans and other animals, that occur within
three horizons of bodily relation and temporality: language, physical exten-
sion, and ﬁnitude. In this work, I would like to more fully develop that anal-
ysis in terms of two concepts: “the people” and “the multitude.”
This article attempts to disrupt simplistic, but common, assumptions
that divide modern politics into totalitarian or fascist forms of government
on the one hand and democratic ones on the other hand because it chal-
lenges the notion of “communicative reason” (to use Habermas’s term)
that, I argue, forms the basis for all constitutional or “rational” forms of
government. My argument assumes a different origin for democracy—one
that starts from what is in-common: affects, language, and at least for hu-
mans, a temporality beginning with a shared sense of ﬁnitude. Such an
origin for democracy sees individuals as singular expressions of in-common
relations rather than as a priori individuals. As an important horizon for
forming social relations and, therefore, individual beings, the topic of lan-
guage constitutes an exemplary horizon for discussing the in-common
nature of beings. If my argument emphasizes human communities, how-
ever, I would like to stress that it is not limited to such. Humans share lan-
guage, affect, and possibly some senses of time with other beings. Togeth-
er these form the in-common horizons for our zoological community and,
in some ways, extend out into the community of the physical universe as a
whole. In so far as language, affect, and forms of temporality constitute pri-
mordial ontological horizons to which we reply, they are informational and
communicational and they give rise to the appearance of our selves as be-
ings and as individuals. Thus, in sharp contrast to the concepts of “the
people” and “communicative reason,” the multitude and the ontological
horizons of the multitude, however speciﬁc, may not in general exclude all
that which is outside of “man” or the human.
II. The “common” of constitutionality
The tradition of political philosophy that ﬁnds community resting on
constitutional interpretations of common law or “reason” itself has, of
course, a long history in, particularly, the Anglo-Saxon countries. Thomas
Hobbes, for example, in the seventeenth century argued that left to their
own devices men form a mob or “multitude” of desires that result in a state
of war (Hardt and Negri, 2000). According to Hobbes, for the sake of peace
the multitude must be organized as a “people” under sovereignty. Later,
Locke would, of course, translate this notion of sovereign law into a notion
of democracy by shifting the basis of reason from the monarchical seat to
that of citizens. The right of individual communication would, under the
guidance of reason, lead to a type of “communicative reason” that would
be the foundation of the democratic State.
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Sovereign and democratic forms of political community are constitu-
tional because they constitute community through reason and reason’s
embodiment in law. Such an assemblage is often “capitalistic” in the sense
that the constituted assemblage is also accumulated under a smaller body
(that is, in the largest sense, “capitalized”); democratic relations are often
synthesized into representational forms that are governmentally higher than
themselves. By this, some powers are selected and combined so as to in-
crease power in certain manners. Direct democracy is replaced by a repre-
sentative democracy that also has a responsibility of managing and leading
the State. Other powers, thus, are simply seen as surplus—trash or leftovers
in regard to the future (what Walter Benjamin (1968b) termed Abfall).
Power here—the “potentia” (Hardt and Negri, 2000) of the multitude in
their individualities and groups—is trimmed and increased according to
ordained rational parameters, and this trimming begins with the basis of
“rational” speech.
The constitutional tradition in political philosophy has deep historical
roots, of course, in the Western democratic tradition, which can easily
enough be seen in the opening words of the United States constitution, “We
the people. . . .” Equally, however, we must recognize that this tradition of
unity founded upon constituted plurality also has been embodied in more
fascist, mystical understandings of the “people,” namely, as the soul of the
nation as in, for example, the National Socialist understanding of das Volk
during the Third Reich in Germany. Though the actual manifestation of
constitutional plurality has been quite different in practice over political
modernity, the form of the modern State remains quite similar. In gener-
al, the modern State is said to embody the people as the common surren-
der of individual desire within a totalizing, “rational” whole—whether that
totalizing whole is understood in terms of legislated laws, a sovereign who
embodies those laws or decrees those laws, or as a mystical soul of a people
that rediscovers itself in national unity especially during moments of nation-
al crises or war.
What I am emphasizing here is the common explanatory logic of dif-
ferent evolutions of the modern State: sublimated individual desire and the
triumph of constitution via a common sense beginning with language.
Language, here, is “public” and “rational” not “private” and “irrational.”
Understanding is achieved by a correspondence of meaning between indi-
viduals beginning with a mutual attunement to a “common sense” of the
world and of language ﬁrst of all. Rationality in language is the ﬁrst proper
measure that then brings about the correspondence of minds and selves
in understanding. Language in the constitutional society must be, as Norb-
ert Wiener claimed, “clear”—that is, exact in terms of correspondence—
else the entire rational community of the State falls apart (Wiener, 1954).
The communicational as well as the informational models that follow
(or precede) this general logic or form for constitutional communities can
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be seen in terms of Realpolitik during times of war or similar moments of
crisis, when the national body is understood as “pulling together”—that is,
reestablishing, or in reality redeﬁning, its cultural, social, and geopolitical
boundaries by means of common pronouncements and judgments. In times
of crisis the community of the State is explicitly expressed in patriotic state-
ments, in the explicit use of force, and in the establishment of new types of
laws. As always, when the implicit borders of a common sense or common
ratio are threatened, then the concept of reason explicitly appears in state-
ments and in the formation of new laws. In this event of direct articulation,
explication, and formalization, the ﬂexibility of a common sense or reason
that deﬁnes the public sphere of a modern nation State becomes less ﬂexi-
ble. “Reason,” as the regulative ideal of common sense, explicitly appears
in the formalization of that “common sense” during periods of crisis.
The democratic political tradition, particularly within the framework
of economic capitalism, stresses the necessity of there being a plurality of
choices for desire to ﬁxate upon and ﬂow through. Particularly the capi-
talist State requires a certain degree of ﬂexibility so as to neither fully re-
press desire nor to allow it to overﬂow the object and thus make the sub-
ject appear to be irrational. The point is not to end desire, but rather to
sublimate it into work or, from the aspect of consumption, satisfy it tempo-
rarily but not permanently. Rather than totally repress or conquer desire,
one wishes to direct it to ﬂow through the conduits, objects, institutions,
and identities of expression that mark the common (this is the nature of
“discipline” according to Foucault [1977]). Common sense, thus, not only
characterizes forms of communication in general in the constitutional State,
but it also is the formal condition for production in general.
At the highest level of the modern State the concern about language
and other “commerce” is not that of maintaining content, but of preserv-
ing (and with that as far as imaginable, recreating) form, not that of repeat-
ing statements per se, but rather that of perpetuating a common sense for
meaning through formal continuity. If change is to occur, in other words,
it should occur conservatively, that is, it should conserve ﬁrst of all the for-
mal conditions for reproduction in the future’s production. And the con-
servation of “form” means here, in its most radical transformation, the
conservation of the most general governing economies through which pow-
er ﬂows and subjects emerge: the preservation of the notion of accumula-
tion and the premise of the necessity of surplus value and proﬁt as govern-
ing principles of everyday relations. (These terms must be thought both
within and outside of speciﬁcally ﬁnancial determinations—that is, these
terms must be thought in regard to representation as accumulation or cap-
ital-ization in general, as well as economically.) The controlled ﬂow of de-
sire is essential for the modern state in its highest form, which today takes
the form of the capitalist “democratic” State. Other twentieth-century forms
of the modern State here (e.g., Stalinist) are “immature” forms that fail
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because they fail to understand the interests that the State has in maintain-
ing itself through and by change, ﬁrst of all, through language or “expression.”
Desire not only may, but it also must be allowed to express itself, but it must
do so within the forms of rationality. Individual subjects are utterly desir-
able, but they are productive subjects only in so far as they are disciplined
for production (Foucault, 1977). The older, “communist” States utterly
failed to understand the necessity for “freedom of expression” insofar as
this phrase does not deeply care about controlling the content of expression
but rather is largely concerned with maintaining forms of expression. And,
except in moments of crisis, it relies on making the “rules” for such innate,
self-censored, and at the level of common sense and the “moves” of ordi-
nary language-games, not at the level of statements, deﬁnitions, or laws. In
this way, the “reason” of the State, its sovereign power, seems to only appear
in times of crisis, and we believe that democracy ﬂourishes because of this.
Where in reality, what we often call “democracy” in the modern constitu-
tional State is sovereign power at the level of formal, immanent, and com-
monsense relations, concerned with maintaining its capacity for reproduc-
tion. On such a social and political basis, all language comes to be seen as
a problem of measure, that is, as a problem of rationality. “One” voices
opinions, “one” makes statements about one’s emotions, and “one” com-
municates information about private and public states. And in times of crisis
or ambivalence, one is given more explicit rules for making such statements.
In communication and information theory, this famous principle of
“freedom of expression” is articulated in Warren Weaver’s rereading of
Claude Shannon’s “The Mathematical Theory of Communication” (“Re-
cent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Communication” [Shan-
non and Weaver, 1949]) within the concept of “freedom of choice.” In this
essay Weaver confuses Shannon’s strictly technical notion of “freedom of
choice” with human choices made within, among other realms, natural
language. In Shannon’s original paper the notion of statistical choice is
explained by the ability to predict words through the statistical occurrence
of letters in relation to one another within a given language. In Weaver’s
interpretation of Shannon’s “freedom of choice,” however, this statistical
example of alphabetic occurrence within a language gives way to semantic
and discursive “choices” (i.e., choices of expression), and, thus, Shannon’s
technical transmission model is reinterpreted within a particular speaker–
hearer model of language (i.e., the conduit metaphor) with the “speaker”
understood as the intentional “individual” of the liberal, and more gener-
ally, the constitutional political tradition. In other words, in Weaver’s work
Shannon’s conduit model of signal transmission becomes a metaphor for
communicative reason. The political meaning of such communicative rea-
son in the Cold War would be expressed more fully in the two editions of
Norbert Wiener’s book, The Human Use of Human Beings (published in 1950
and 1954; Day, 2001).
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In Weaver and Wiener’s readings, communicative reason enters the age
of statistics; there is no absolute border between communicative reason and
irrationality, but rather it appears in terms of statistical possibilities for se-
mantic clarity and “understanding.” As Wiener argues, the entire appara-
tus of the State, particularly its judiciary and laws, depends on semantic
clarity (Wiener, 1954, chapter 6). Here, empirically veriﬁable statements,
tropes, opinions, and all sorts of linguistic and epistemological types become
a certain type of information “sent” from someone to another or to others.
The conditions for understanding and for clarity are not interrogated in
this model, however. Nowhere in Weaver or Wiener’s texts can one ﬁnd any
discussion of the production of meaning outside of the concept of “free-
dom of choice.” Subjects and language remain distinct from one another,
as if language was only a commodity. No account is given in their texts of
language being a communal property. No account is given of the possibil-
ity for this world—or of any world—by and through language. No account
is given of the subject’s development, that is, the subject’s subjectivity, in
terms of forms of language. Instead, the subject is spoken of in terms of
eighteenth-century Enlightenment values (a certain notion of freedom
based on classical subjectivity) and in terms of capitalist values (a commod-
itized notion of choice).
Philosophically, and poetically as well, communicative reason stems
from a tradition of interpreting truth from Plato to Descartes to, at least,
Kant. Plato in his Republic expels actors because they ambivalently appear
to be someone other than who they are and thus cannot embody true and
trustworthy identity. Descartes describes truth in terms of the attributes of
“clear and distinct” ideas; vague or ambivalent ideas are untrue or worse,
false. For Kant, objects are represented in the understanding according to
the formal conditions of the understanding, and those formal conditions
constitute the basis for the universal judgments of practical reason, and thus,
for morality and law, as well as, of course, judgments of taste and knowledge.
Since ideas can be formed by nothing other than language, the relation-
ship between truth and writing in Western metaphysics is to be found in
the problem of representation.2
It is with the greatest unconscious irony that Wiener in The Human Use
of Human Beings rests his “republic” on the clarity of language, foremost, the
clarity of scientiﬁc language, only then to undercut this claim in the begin-
ning of the ﬁfth chapter of his book by arguing that mathematics (“which
most of us see as the most factual of all sciences” [Wiener, 1954, p. 95]) is,
in essence, metaphorical. The key to understanding this tension lies in
Wiener’s belief that language must be controlled in order for human systems
to exhibit the highest rational order in the face of chaos. This control be-
gins with knowing “man’s built in purpose” (Wiener, 1950, p. 210). Wien-
er, like Weaver, with the latter’s “engineering theory” whose goal is to de-
sign a language “with a view to the totality of things that man may wish to
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say” (Shannon and Weaver, 1949, p. 117), argues through a circular and
regressive logic that reduces all truth value to rhetoric, speciﬁcally, to a
discourse that we, today, term “informational” or “communicational.” Ac-
cording to Wiener, we must say only what we know is true, but we can say
what we know is true only if it is rhetorically clear. Thus, for Wiener the
“true” can only occur in language representationally. In this model, lan-
guage is not seen as a production of meaning or knowledge, but, rather, it
is the medium for such, but only in so far as it is “clear.” What the “clear”
is, however, is never stated nor can it be, but rather than being a grammat-
ical or linguistic category, it is a category of judgment. And judgment and
its production are not contested, for they rest in “common sense.” In such
an account there is little room for discussing knowledge as a function of
linguistic production even though by grounding truth as a function of rhet-
oric that is precisely where the grounds for discussion lie. Such a discussion
has occurred: for example, in the third chapter of Rousseau’s Essay on the
Origins of Language (1781/1968) where representation is seen as a product
of linguistic production beginning with ﬁgurative speech. Wiener, howev-
er, rejects metaphor or other such rhetorical ﬁgures as the basis for truth
because the social implications of this exceed the truth conditions required
by the constitutional and representational State as Wiener conceives of it.
Of course, even as Wiener (1954) suggests at the beginning of his ﬁfth
chapter, the very problem of philosophy, as a discourse on truth, is that
language exceeds and, indeed, produces this truth rather than is embod-
ied by it. Wiener’s text amply demonstrates this when it evokes metaphor
again and again as its central vehicle for textual production. What is lack-
ing in the positivist account is precisely that which Rousseau attempted to
account for, that is, language as a means of production for “truth” and for
many other discursive and social values. Because Wiener and Weaver are
unwilling to seriously engage language as a generational means of production
instead of simply as an instrumental tool for production, language becomes
reduced to a discourse on truth, most speciﬁcally in terms of meaning. The
concept of meaning, within the domain of truth, is then divided into a set
of binary distinctions such as “clear” and “unclear,” “true” or “ambivalent”
(at best, or at worse, “false”), “scientiﬁc” or “nonscientiﬁc,” and in terms
of communication and information, “successful” or “unsuccessful” trans-
mission, “true” or “false” documents or information. Bluntly stated, Wien-
er would have been wise to engage in a more materialist analysis because,
like Weaver, his conception of expressive “freedom” is even more restric-
tive than the democratic capitalist State he was trying to defend against what
he saw as the twin evils of the day, fascism and communism.
The classical understanding of truth in terms of highly formalized or
restrictive economies of language—valued not only in eighteenth-century
scientiﬁc discourse (Foucault, 1970) but also in eighteenth-century drama
and poetry, and as JoAnne Yates (Yates, 1989) has shown, in commerce
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during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—was challenged in the arts
beginning with Romantic poetics. In Romantic poetics (in different man-
ners, German, then English and French), and later in the form of the twen-
tieth-century avant-garde, knowledge takes the form of “new” statements
produced by artistic techniques. The production of the modernist “new,”
however, splits off into different aesthetic veins in the twentieth century:
one type of modernism follows capitalism in premising “the new” in terms
of new content while maintaining old forms, while the other type of mod-
ernism premises “the new” in terms of new forms, sometimes explicitly join-
ing with Marxism (i.e., Brecht’s work and Benjamin’s commentaries on it)
in a critique of economic production through a critique of aesthetic pro-
duction (that is, production as the production of the primary forms and
relations for reproduction, including, of course, that of a common sense or
aesthesis). While the ﬁrst type of aesthetics continues in the more tradition-
al representational “modern” arts, such as painting, the second type of
aesthetics reached its logical climax, at least in terms of aesthetics per se, in
the avant-garde performance “happenings” of the 1960s, where the very
sensuousness of the event itself was seen as a moment of “truth” by virtue
of its immediacy and nonreducibility.
One of the important elements of the counterclassical movements of
literary Romanticism was the insight that the repetition of form was always
already inclusive of a difference that differed from the same by virtue of time-
valued and site-speciﬁc qualities. (This insight was central to philosophic
Romanticism, as well, such as Hegel’s philosophy, while at the same time then
subsuming this insight to philosophy’s reduction of such difference to the
self-same exactness of truth [e.g., Left and Right readings of Hegel’s work]).
To put the matter another way, difference was seen as the basis for identity
itself, existence and history as the basis for essence or truth. Now, if repeti-
tion was never simply a production of the same, then categories or mecha-
nisms that produced an absolute sameness within repetition (i.e., philosoph-
ical truth) must be utilizing other forces than that of their simple repetition
in order to do this just as machinery uses formal molds to contain and shape
the material being expressed. The avant-garde attempted to exploit this dif-
ference inherent in the same by developing it by means of difference in scale,
context, material, and time, as well as by bringing to light the extratextual
forces that were deployed so as to maintain truth over time and space. Es-
sential to the avant-garde was the notion of recombination with a disregard
for normative instrumentality but, also, with a complete dedication to rec-
ognizing the material means for production. The material necessity of pro-
duction, however, was expanded beyond a teleological formalism to a larg-
er ethical realm. And, on the other hand, the Kantian category for art,
“purposeless purpose,” was employed not toward aestheticism but rather
toward a reassertion of art or skill (techne) beyond the narrow “technologi-
cal” parameters employed in the modern machine “industries.”3
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III. The Affective Bond
It may seem that such considerations as philosophy and art are very far
from discussing community in terms of new information and communica-
tion technologies. But, as I have been suggesting, they are not if we consid-
er that the suppositions that we make about the nature of knowledge and
language are presuppositions upon our understanding of what communi-
ty and other forms of relations and identity are and can be and that new
information and communication technologies act as important mediators
in bridging the relationship between knowledge and language in the
present and past and the relationships and identities that are and will be
with us in the present and future.
The ways that these new technologies form a bridge to the future are
always important considerations of their invention and speculations about
their social meaning (speculations that often drive momentous economic
events, for example, that of the recent dot.com “bubble,” as well as drive
further technological design and innovation). Doug Engelbart considered
the networked sharing of knowledge to be of tremendous importance, and
he embodied this in his vision of shared computer networks. Bill Gates and
others have recently attempted to return computers to handwriting vis-à-
vis the Tablet PC. Graphic User Interfaces, as well as, obviously, command
languages, have worked toward standardizing language in information re-
trieval. Microsoft PowerPoint has revolutionized and truly changed what
constitutes, today, a public lecture and the amount of time and intellectu-
al space a speaker and audience can assume for that event.
The effects of information and communication technologies took hold
on a mass scale beginning with ﬁlm and radio in the 1930s and television
particularly after the Second World War. Print media is comparatively re-
stricted in relation to auditory or multimedia broadcast media because of
issues of literacy, distribution, and attention. With the arrival of modern
broadcast technologies, an entire nation could be reached, allowing for
both broadcast information to ﬁlter into all aspects of local demographics
and the standardization of those demographics in terms of language and
culture (as, for example, was the case with Italy following the Second World
War). In other words, broadcast technologies allowed the formation of a
cultural cohesion and hegemony across nation-states as never before. Gov-
ernments in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century showed a great deal of
interest in using such technologies for these purposes nationally and inter-
nationally, and one sees the effective nationalistic uses of such technologies
not only in the fascist and totalitarian States during this period, but also in
the democratic States, along with the use of increasingly popular techniques
and tools from the social sciences such as those involved with polling. With
such technologies and techniques, not only could persons individually and
collectively be organized around central symbols and themes, but also, and
even more importantly in the democratic countries, through opinion polls
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their wishes could be monitored and guided so as to coincide with commer-
cial and State priorities. Such technologies and techniques gave rise not only
to the “masses” as the basis for the fascist States, but they also helped form
and express the desires of “the people” within the formal interests of those
polling them and broadcasting to them in democratic States.
Walter Benjamin observed these uses of information and communica-
tion technologies in the 1930s, seeing in them standardizing tools for in-
troducing and maintaining formal constraints for language and actions
while allowing consumerist expression through events such as entertain-
ment and opinion. For Benjamin and Marxist avant-garde artists of the time
such as Bertolt Brecht, reality under capitalism was characterized by con-
tradictions and paradoxes that were then obscured and forgotten in nar-
ratives of progress. For Benjamin the disappearance of local traditions
opened the door to the construction of national traditions erected by the
State or by industry (for example, those erected under German National
Socialism) (Benjamin1968a, 1968b). The manufacture of tradition suggest-
ed that “everyman” could be the teller of stories that he or she read in the
newspapers, stories whose very function is to distance reality within a gen-
erality of public information and opinion (Benjamin, 1968a). Local tradi-
tion gave way to public information, which supplied the range of opinions
to be expressed on sanctioned matters of importance, leading to an end-
less circulation of what Heidegger termed during the late 1920s “Alltägli-
chkeit” (everyday) chatter (Heidegger, 1996), which was so well parodied at
the time in Robert Musil’s novel, The Man Without Qualities. With mass ﬁlm,
radio, and television, the viewpoint that was adopted was that of a modern
“everyman,” an everyman that expressed shared known desires and opin-
ions about a world that no one ever fully lived in, but about which every-
one was constantly concerned.
In Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement Between the Mental Lives of
Savages and Neurotics (1913, 1950), Freud presents a modern political model
through a psychoanalytic reading of ethnographic materials. This political
model is founded upon the psychoanalytic sublimation of desire through
an object of identity. In Totem and Taboo the social, emotive concern that
each person expresses for one another, what Freud termed the “emotion-
al or affective bond” (Gefühlsbindung), is transformed into an identity with
a sovereign or leader (Führer) through a combination of jealousy and guilt
(Freud, 1913, 1950). Reason is embodied in the leader (the father), and it
forms the transcendental bond that both binds and suppresses the desire
of the primitive brothers who plot to overcome it by really or symbolically
killing the father. Freud’s historical myth in Totem and Taboo reenacts the
central myth of the Freudian Oedipal economy, the child’s hatred and love
for the father that leads to his “rational organization” and maturation, ex-
cept now the male child increases his power through political, not just in-
dividual, organization.
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As Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen (1993) has suggested, however, Freud’s so-
cial bond presupposes a bond before reason, that is, a bond before either the
identiﬁcation with the father or the resulting identiﬁcation of the “broth-
ers” with one another, just as Hobbes’s model of the State does, without
Hobbes realizing it. The affective bond is the ontologically primordial bond
prior to its reinvestment in terms of reason via identiﬁcation, and with that,
the resultant forces of love and hate. Indeed, as Freud’s model shows, iden-
tiﬁcation, or the reduction of the many to the one, is the principle of truth
that supports the concept of “reason” in the Western tradition. In this way,
psychoanalysis, as much of the Western metaphysical tradition, works toward
the rational organization of affects toward a concept of true identity. Where
for Hobbes the absence of reason leads to a state of war by the fact of war-
ring individual desires, for Freud lack of sublimation leads to the emptiness
of a state without a State, a community without reason—that is, without
reason as an organizing principle for community, as a transcendental prin-
ciple for law and discipline, or even as a regulative principle for a State yet
to come. The myth of the State founded in reason brings with it not only
the possibility for common identity, but also the possibility for common
misidentiﬁcation and even resultant war. Working from the top down, we
can see that within this State, in fact, the logic of reason and its opposites
are logical and pragmatic necessities that require that force be used to
enforce not only the rational but also the irrational as ﬁgures inscribed on
more primary affective relations.
The function of mass information and communication technologies in
modernity often has been to appropriate this common ground, this com-
mon Gefühlsbindung in affect, so as to “capitalize” or accumulate this in-
common power within ﬂows that would create political and/or ﬁnancial
power in terms of direct sovereignty or in terms of indirect proﬁt and oli-
garchy. In so doing, the rational organization of the affective bond is nec-
essary, and so with this, the mythology of desire and reason, “messages” and
“communication.” With mass information and communication, the in-com-
mon of affect, inclusive of language, is made common for the production of political
or ﬁnancial accumulation and proﬁt.
IV. “In-common”
Benjamin suggests, however, that information and communication
technologies evolve faster than their appropriation by conserving social
forces. For Benjamin, photography and then ﬁlm are prime examples of
this: by expanding and refocusing what could be seen in a new scale and
rhythm, new political techniques then needed to be developed to catch up
to these innovations and reappropriate them (Benjamin, 1968b). A mid-
century example of this may be seen in Manuel De Landa’s analysis of
United States spy photography in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Accord-
ing to De Landa, this technology became so accurate as to cause the Unit-
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ed States’ Pentagon to awkwardly change its claims of Soviet bomber and
missile production and even to begin claiming that the Soviet’s military
threat lies not in what could be seen by high-resolution spy-satellites, but
rather in what could not be seen by these technologies: in other words, to
claim that “there had to be Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) hid-
den somewhere” (De Landa, 1991, p. 199), and that this, indeed, was the
source of the threat itself. This rhetorical shift from positive assertions of
proof to negative assertions for a proof always said to be shortly around the
corner suggests that sometimes the advancements in information and com-
munication technologies outstrip political control, forcing embarrassing
political situations on the very agents that depended on that technology for
maintaining and asserting power. Technological series and social, political,
and, overall, technical series are not exact in terms of their effects (partic-
ularly over large populations) even when there is a causal relationship be-
tween them.
“Information commons” arguments in regard to the Internet have ar-
gued for preserving the Internet as a public space where “the public” can
maintain itself against commercialism and its instrumental reason. In the
past, this argument was made for radio and television, and as the Internet
has become more heavily directed toward multimedia convergence and,
subsequently, toward corporately mediated broadband, the information
commons argument has reappeared with this set of technologies as well.
Though this argument about the need for an information commons
seems to me important, as could be expected from what has preceded I feel
that there is a concept of “common” that, ontologically at least, goes beyond
that offered by the liberal conceptualization of “the public” and, in fact,
underlies this latter notion. Such an argument, centered on issues of the
in-common, goes “beyond good and evil,” placing moral and policy con-
cerns on a wider conceptual ground of ontology, focused on questions about
the total relation of bodies as both physical and intellectual entities. Such
a focus doesn’t negate the importance of the moral or the judicial realm
nor that of governmental policy, but rather it focuses on the always already
in-common that underlie these “common” realms of mediation.
As has been earlier suggested in the discussion of Freud’s work, the
philosophy of the constitutional state presupposes social bonds that are then
organized into a political State. In these models of the modern State, de-
sire is viewed as belonging to and emerging from each individual, and each
desire must then surrender itself to a sublimation within an implicit com-
mon sense (“reason”), explicitly formalized or “deﬁned” in moments of
doubt or crisis. Such a model of desire underlies Hobbes’s account of the
Stateless state characterized by “every man against every man,” but in so
doing it also asserts a prior social bond whose presence it then negates.
Let us clarify this issue of primordial ontological relations further. What
are these relations and what are their implications? How do they differ from
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the ontic and political assumptions of constitutional forms of the State as
deﬁned by various types of communicative reason? We have suggested sev-
eral answers. First, the priority of affect is central to this ontology and its
conception of any state or community of being—individual, group, govern-
mental “State,” etc. All bodies are affected by one another, and their very
“being” is a product of these affects. “Being” is a trace of affects. Second,
the facticity of language is privileged in this ontology as one of the funda-
mental horizons for affect. We are born into language. Language is not just
a tool. The fact that there is language is coextensive with being. Third, our
in-common relations with sentient beings are characterized by a temporal-
ity of ﬁnitude. With humans, at least, this basis for community takes the form
of a sense of ﬁnitude in which death and the thought of death are emblem-
atic events. Further, this sense of ﬁnitude is marked and remarked by our
existential limitations, giving birth to identiﬁcation and misidentiﬁcation,
love and hate. In this manner, the sense of ﬁnitude marks both the in-com-
mon and the common, the ontological and the ontic in Heidegger’s terms
(Heidegger, 1996). Finitude characterizes our ontological being insofar as
it is the in-common structuring of our general mode of temporal existence.
Insofar as it is experienced individually in the mode of death, concern,
anxiety, etc., then it appears on ontic, existential grounds.4  The meaning
of time in terms of ﬁnitude in regard to information and communication
systems is difﬁcult to ascertain. Insofar as such systems are seen as means
or as products of will and representation, they may be read in terms of a
relation to death and limitations, or equally, as desires for overcoming such
through “reason” and “communication.” However, insofar as they are seen
as issuing from and developing always already prior relations of affect and
language, they may be seen as expressions of such (as we will soon touch
upon in reference to Berardi’s comments).
Thus, humans, as well as other animals, always already share various
ways of being in-common with one another. As various writers—most fa-
mously, Maurice Blanchot (1988), George Bataille in various writings (which
Blanchot is partly responding to), and more recently, Jean-Luc Nancy
(1991), Giorgio Agamben (1993), and Antonio Negri (2003b), and Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000)—have noted, community is a function of
an always already in-common ontological ground.
The constituted community is always impossible, it is “always already”
because it is both always present and always yet to come. In Derrida’s words,
after Blanchot, it comes to us from the future (a-venir) in so far as that fu-
ture is made up of potential pasts and presents. Human historical existence
is characterized by the future anterior: in Heidegger’s words (Heidegger,
1996) by a certain type of historical retrieval or repetition (wiederholen).5
For Spinoza in his Ethics, thought and extension are two attributes of sub-
stance or being. The expression of this sharedness, though, takes place, as
Negri writes, “at the edge of time” (Negri, 2003b). As language shows us,
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community is the constant expression of a shared being, led by affects and
by the fact of language and diverging by the fact of languages.6
What, then, is the role of information and communication technolo-
gies in regard to community? This is a difﬁcult question if we limit their
“role” to actions occurring within the common assumptions and metaphors
for language and to supporting a conception of State that founds itself
upon, and preserves itself by, these same assumptions and metaphors. On
the one hand, in what we may term in this context “high modernity,” much
of the role of such technologies within political economy has been that of
the formal, if not the substantial, reproduction of the conditions for pro-
ducing meaning at the behest of controlling modes and persons in power.
This occurs negatively through sovereign suppression or more positively
through the formal directing of in-common powers via education, training,
discipline, recognition, and the social construction of hopes and dreams.
On the other hand, sometimes opposing the modern state and its disciplin-
ary uses of information and communication technologies, we have the
narrative of the information commons, which largely avoids these formal
issues and instead attempts to reestablish the republic on a narrative of free
exchange.
But what happens when the information commons is always already
there, when what is in-common is the constant ebb and ﬂow of affects, of
the phenomenology of in-formation—not yet, or even ever, a fact or a com-
modity (“information”): not that of an orderly production but rather in-
formation as affects and their relations and self-organization? Not just
“philosophical” or more broadly, “theoretical,” the question is always his-
torical and ethical-political in character: How can we think of information and
communication technologies in relation to the in-common of in-formation? Asking
this question is the essence of any “philosophical” or “theoretical” politi-
cal view of information and information technologies. More broadly,
though, asking the question of “in-formation” in relation to “information”
means working against the often inevitable institutionalization or habitua-
tion of events. This is why, too often at least, any metaphysics of informa-
tion (Spinoza, 1982)7  is simply tautological: “information” today is almost
always solely understood according to the metaphysics of presence and re-
presentation that runs through Western philosophy and culture and that
dominates modernity.
To think, literally, against information means to think against not only
metaphysics and its dominating presence in modern societies but it means,
most importantly, to think against this in terms of our historical conceptions
of time itself, most importantly, against conceptions of time as simple, ob-
jective, and sequential presences (what Heidegger [1996] calls the “ordi-
nary” or “vulgar” concept of time)—a foundational “context” in which his-
tory too is understood as a series of progressive “nows.” It is neither possible
nor necessary to think dialectically opposite of this, but rather it is neces-
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sary to think critically against this if we are to account for human agency
“in” history and thus reopen history to the experience of time itself. To
reopen history to time itself means, for humans, to disclose historical time
to the essence of time, that is, to the complexities of events, wherefrom
various senses of time and series of histories open up and unfold. Further,
this means that agency (though not at all necessarily that agency of the clas-
sical subject and its will and its freedom) is once again seen as important
in relation to time and that its freedom is seen not as an attribute to its
subjectivity but rather as foundational for the possibility of their being a
subject at all. To think being at the “edge of time,” which is, at the same
time, the edge and possibility of beings and the “site” where dwells the po-
tentiality of being altogether (Negri, 2003b), is the essential activity of any
critical philosophy (Derrida, 1982; Heidegger, 1996; Dalton, 2002; Negri,
2003a, 2003b;), including a critical philosophy of knowledge and, today,
information. The analytical necessity is to realize that this “edge” is not
divorced from beings and doesn’t simply exist objectively from them as the
inﬁnite but rather is being itself insofar as this latter constitutes the essence
of beings and makes up the eternal of each their own “nows.” This is the point
where being as potentia is the multiple series of both pasts and futures that
meet in each singularity, in so far as that singularity exists as an event and
not simply as an “individual” traditionally conceived.
To return to the problem of the in-common in relation to the common
and information and communication technologies, I think that in the past
few years we have come to realize that various new, digital information and
communication technologies are not the driving force to the in-common,
but rather they are a means for its expression today.
To borrow from Franco Berardi, we may state that the essence of the
Internet is the social net—that is, the net of being (Berardi, 1998), the relations
of the in-common. Information and communication technologies are means
of expression for this “net” of the in-common, but only one set of means.
In the beginning of his essay “The Question Concerning Technology”
(“Die Frage nach der Technik” (1953) [Heidegger, 1977b]), Heidegger
challenges the traditional view of technology that is itself technological.
Instead of viewing technology as a means to an end, Heidegger counters
the modern conception of technology, as a teleological mechanism, with
the Ancient Greek notion of techne. He does this by reengaging Aristotle’s
four causes from the Physics, that is to say, the four conditions of technolo-
gy in terms of causation—formal, material, efﬁcient, and ﬁnal. Heidegger
challenges the Latin tradition’s interpretation of cause (aitia), arguing that
Aristotle’s notion of cause is not that of a means for teleological determi-
nation but rather of coresponsibility for bringing a thing into being (poie-
sis) by man, a process in its speciﬁcity (in contrast to the poiesis of nature)
that characterizes techne (regardless of whether it occurs in the “ﬁne arts”
or in what used to be called the “industrial arts”).
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Information and communication technologies and techniques also may
be considered in the mode of their coresponsibility in bringing things forth,
in allowing them to be expressed in certain manners. According to the
epistemological framework of modern technology that governs so many
forms of human life today, nature is understood as a resource and as a means
for this technology (“natural resources”), persons are understood the same
way (“human resources”) and so are social relationships even in their most
general and “private” manners (“social capital”). Heidegger was quite right
to point to this issue, including in this list, as the most problematic and also
as the most threatening because it mediates understanding as a whole, lan-
guage (technologically understood as a resource for communication and
information transmission).
Today, even more than in Heidegger’s day, however, clearly the re-
sourcehood of our modern resources is running out. Marx termed the
overextension of capital to the point where it snuffs out the extracapitalist
resources that support it “real subsumption.” Instead of aiding in real sub-
sumption by increasingly monitoring human and natural activity for the
purposes of further surveillance and exploitation, information and com-
munication technologies need to be viewed in terms of their coresponsi-
bility regarding affects, language, and, ultimately, time, and the relation of
these three “elements” to the poiesis or emergence of community and be-
ing in general.
To “respond” means that one responds to something given. Thus, re-
sponsibility in terms of information and communication technology means,
foremost, to listen to affects, language, and time in a way other than the
rationality of modern “common sense,” that is, in terms other than as “re-
sources” or commodities, or to put it another way, as “presences” that are
then, in Heidegger’s words, objectively available as “ready-to-hand” (zu-
handen) entities. The response that information and communication must
give to the question of community will be formed in how it addresses these
three “elements.” Each element needs to be listened to in relation to the
other; each must be listened to in terms of the whole. Each is coresponsi-
ble for “community,” whether such a term refers to the singularity of “indi-
viduals” or “groups.” To listen to a whole means to help it emerge toward a
whole—a whole that is never a totality nor is a fully rested “state.” Informa-
tion and communication technologies are only responsible insofar as they
maintain this openness that is being, and they are only politically responsi-
ble insofar as they assert this openness in contrast to the constituted State.
This event is primordial, a function of being and time.
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Notes
1. An early, oral version of this paper was given in a session at the 2002 American Society for
Information Science and Technology Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Novem-
ber 21, 2002. I would like to thank my copresenters, Leah Lievrouw and Elisabeth Daven-
port, for their presentations and comments during the session.
2. Derrida’s work (1982), particularly his early work, engaged this problem in the domain
of philosophical linguistics, beginning with the trope of voice as a privileged means for
logos.
3. Heidegger’s valorization of this “purposelessness” in the face of instrumentalism can be
seen in his defense of aesthetics in the face of generalized cybernetics (Heidegger, 1977a).
Unfortunately, Heidegger’s critique of art often ended with a reduction of art to an aes-
thetized understanding of philosophical truth, forming a weird parallel to performance
art’s philosophical understanding of aesthetics. In both cases, art ends at the point of truth,
just as much as philosophy ends at the point of aesthetics. In both cases, a more material-
ist understanding of production would have revealed different surfaces or “rhetorics”
operative in the production of meaning (philosophy or episteme) and sense (art or aesthe-
sis). In other words, the parallel deadend of performance art and the Heideggerian un-
derstanding of truth lie in their confusion of the ends of production with the means of
production. Despite a common concern with phenomenology, phenomena are read in
both these approaches according to a metaphysics of identity rather than of difference:
the identity of meaning in sense or the identity of sense in meaning. What fails to be
thought are phenomenon as the event of relation between sense and meaning, between
episteme and aesthesis. The two categories are not reducible to one another because they
are two aspects of becoming: singularities and the “affects” or senses of their production.
This is the basis from which all post-“logocentric” arts and knowledge must proceed, in-
cluding those that study language in events of “communication” and even “information”
(if, indeed, it is possible to displace these terms from their modern logocentric inscrip-
tions).
4. It must be noted that language, and even affect too, of course, may be viewed ontological-
ly or ontically. Language may be interpreted in terms of individual intention, affect in terms
of will and representation. But, as we have noted, these ontic modes are structured by social
parameters. Death, however, is deﬁned in this way to a lesser extent because it is not an
expression of an in-common relation but rather the withdrawal of beings back into an in-
common inorganic being. As such, in anxiety, death literally “throws” beings out of their
in-common relations in ways that may drag language and affect with it. In other words,
with the thought of death the chasm between the ontological and the ontic becomes much
stronger, though with the experience of death this difference becomes so much weaker
as to, of course, eventually collapse.
5. An insightful reading of temporality in Heidegger, Blanchot, and Derrida’s works is Her-
man Rapaport’s classic (1989).
6. This fact of language and this fact of languages that so much characterizes the relation of
being to beings for humans, and that, when seen in a larger context of affects and “lan-
guage” characterizes the relation of being to beings universally is that which is most over-
looked in information studies that are concerned with the linguistic metaphor of seman-
tic “messages” and their rational correspondence. Insofar as this latter, rather than the
former, sense remains the focus of information, we will remain caught within an anthro-
pomorphic and rationalist science. One purpose of this article, as well as an important strain
of almost all my work in the ﬁeld of information studies, has been to shift the grounds for
analysis from a cognitive and anthropomorphic focus to a perspective that looks at the
problem of information ontologically and historically, not to mention sometimes attempt-
ing to address a zoological, if not to say, a cosmic scope. In this manner, it critically ad-
dresses the Enlightenment discourse on “man” (a discourse that clearly can be seen in
Norbert Wiener’s works [see Day, 2001]) from the aspects of episteme (inclusive of the
modern concept of information), ontos, and aesthesis before the “reﬁnement” of these cat-
egories according to modern subdivisions dictated by “technical” approaches (itself, as I
have suggested following Heidegger, a “perversion” of the ancient Greek concept of techne).
The increasing division of knowledge (episteme) into knowledge and information, the di-
vision of being (ontos) into public action and policy and that of private psychology, and
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the division of feeling (aesthesis) into the physical senses and the ﬁne arts, along with the
division of making (techne) into the practices of the “industrial arts” and the “ﬁne arts”
(following the Kantian discourse on teleological pragmatism or “purposefulness”) is long
in coming in Western culture, but its full blossoming (far from over, today) is relatively
recent, dating from the late Enlightenment and the coemergence of modern industrial-
ism and modern capitalism. The category of the “modern” may perhaps be seen as the
beginning of this “turn” in Western thought in relation to, but also in counterdistinction
to, the “Ancients,” particularly the works of the Ancient Greeks.
7. This is not to be confused with a philosophy of information, however, which, properly
speaking is not philosophy applied to the problem of information (i.e., a philosophy of
information), but rather is information, as a component or synonym for events, applied
to the rewriting of the dominant metaphysics of philosophy, that is, of representation struc-
tured according to Aristotelian form–content, genre–species, analytical analysis. Gilles
Deleuze’s work [for example, Deleuze 1993 and 1994] is exemplary for challenging this
tradition of representation with one of surfaces and emergence, utilizing baroque archi-
tecture, thermodynamic theory, material emergence analyses (chemical, genetic, evolu-
tionary), and various elements from the history of philosophy (stoicism, empiricism, Spino-
za’s work, etc.) to rewrite dominant notions in philosophy and Western cultures. The
articulation of information as an event, and events in terms of information, is yet to be
written for LIS, though it has appeared in the physical sciences, to some extent in the so-
cial sciences, and in philosophy, and in different ways than Deleuze, sociology (e.g., Ni-
klas Luhmann’s work).
References
Agamben, G. (1993). The coming community. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Benjamin, W. (1968a). On some motifs in Baudelaire. In Illuminations: Essays and reﬂections (pp.
155–200). New York: Schocken Books.
Benjamin, W. (1968b). The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. In Illumina-
tions: Essays and reﬂections (pp. 217–251). New York: Schocken Books.
Berardi, F. (Bifo). (1998). La nefasta utopia di Potere operaio: Lavoro tecnica movimento nel labora-
torio politico del Sessantotto italiano. Rome: Castelvecchi.
Blanchot, M. (1988). The unavowable community. Barrytown, NY: Station Hill Press.
Borch-Jacobsen, M. (1993). The primal band. In The emotional tie: Psychoanalysis, mimesis, and
affect (pp. 1–36). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Dalton, J. (2002). “The art of time”: An interview with David Wood. Contretemps 3, July 2002.
Retrieved September 27, 2003, from http://www.usyd.edu.au/contretemps/3July2002/
time-wood.pdf.
Day, R. (1996). Animal songs. (Originally published in Standpoints, online journal, by K. Bur-
nett, Ed.). Retrieved September 27, 2003, from http://www.lisp.wayne.edu/~ai2398/
animal.htm.
Day, R. (1998). Diagrammatic bodies. In Organized worlds: Explorations in technology and organi-
zation with Robert Cooper (pp. 95–107). London: Routledge.
Day, R. (2001). The modern invention of information: Discourse, history, and power. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press.
De Landa, M. (1991). War in the age of intelligent machines. New York: Zone Books.
Deleuze, G. (1993). The fold: Leibniz and the baroque. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, G. (1994). Difference and repetition. New York: Columbia University Press.
Derrida, J. (1982). Ousia and gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time (A. Bass, Trans.). In
Margins of philosophy (pp. 29–67). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Foucault, M. (1970). The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences. New York: Vintage
Books.
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York: Pantheon Books.
Freud, S. (1950). Totem and taboo: Some points of agreement between the mental lives of savages and
neurotics. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1913)
Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1977a). The end of philosophy and the task of thinking. In Basic writings: From
Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964) (pp. 370–392). New York: Harper.
426 library trends/winter 2004
Heidegger, M. (1977b). The question concerning technology. In The question concerning tech-
nology, and other essays (pp. 3–35). New York: Harper and Row.
Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and time ( J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany: State University of New
York Press.
Nancy, J.-L. (1991). The inoperative community. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Negri, A. (2003a). The constitution of time. In Time for revolution (pp. 19–135). London: Con-
tinuum Publishers.
Negri, A. (2003b). Kairòs, alma venus, multitudo: Nine lessons to myself. In Time for revolution
(pp. 137–261). London: Continuum Publishers.
Rapaport, H. (1989). Heidegger and Derrida: Reﬂections on time and language. Lincoln: Universi-
ty of Nebraska Press.
Rousseau, J. J. (1968). Essai sur l’origine des langues: où il est parlé de la mélodie et de l’imitation
musicale [Essays on the origins of language]. Bordeaux: Ducros. (Original work published
1731)
Shannon, C. E., & Weaver, W. (1949). The mathematical theory of communication. Urbana: Uni-
versity of Illinois.
Spinoza, B. (1982). The ethics and selected letters. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
Wiener, N. (1950). The human use of human beings: Cybernetics and society. Cambridge: Riverside.
Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings: Cybernetics and society. 2nd ed. New York: De
Capo.
Yates, J. (1989). Control through communication: The rise of systems in American management. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press.
